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RECENT CASES
INSURANCE-SUICIDE OR SELF-INFLICTED INJURIES-UNINTENTIONAL
DEATH OF INSANE INSURED DETERMINED SuicIDE-The decedent,
while drunk and temporarily insane, killed himself by stepping into
the path of a school bus. His wife brought suit upon an accident
insurance policy which excluded loss caused by "suicide, sane or
insane." 1 The jury determined the death was not suicide, and a
judgment entered on this verdict in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed
by the Court of Civil Appeals. 2 The Supreme Court of Texas, one
judge dissenting, held that because of the "suicide, sane or insane"
provision, the insurance company was not liable even though the
decedent did not intend to take his life and could not realize the
moral and physical consequences of his act. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
McLaughlin, 380 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1964).
This case thus adopts the majority view even though a perusal
of the decisions since 1930 indicates a definite trend toward the
minority view, which holds that consciousness of the physical nature
and consequences of the act and an intention to kill oneself are
essential to invoke the "suicide, sane or insane" exclusion.3 Unless
these conditions are present, the death is accidental.'
During the nineteenth century, the insurance companies did
not add the words "sane or insane" to the suicide exclusion clause,5
and were held liable where the insured destroyed himself while
insane.6 When the words were added, the majority of the courts
extended the suicide exclusion clause to self-destruction by an insane
as well as by a sane person.7  Suicide is generally defined as
intentional self-destruction,8 and in cases not involving the "sane
or insane" clause the majority view jurisdictions have adhered to
1. The clause read: "Insurance under this policy shall not cover any loss caused
directly or indirectly; wholly or partly, or contributed to substantially, by bodily or
mental infirmity; or ptomaines; or bacterial infections (except pyogenic infections which
shall occur through an accidental cut or wound) ; or any other kind of disease; or medical
or surgical treatment (except such as may result directly from surgical operations made
necessary solely by injuries covered by this policy); or war, or any act of war; or
suicide, sane or insane."
2. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, 370 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
3. Muzenich v. Grand Carniollan Slovenian Catholic Union, 154 Ran. 537, 119 P.2d
504 (1941) ; National Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 194 Ky. 355, 239 S.W. 35 (1922).
4. Masonic Life Ass'n v. Pollard's Guardian, 121 Ky. 349, 89 S.W. 219 (1905) ; Mutual
Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Daviess' Ex'r., 87 Ky. 541, 9 S.W. 812 (1888).
5. VANCE, INSURANCE 569 (3rd ed. 1951).
6. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U.S. 468 (1893) ; Life Ins. Co. v.
Terry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 580 (1873).
7. Blgelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 284 (1876) ; Jenkins v.
National Union, 118 Ga. 587, 45 S.E. 449 (1903) ; Hart v. Modern Woodmen of America, 60
Kan. 678, 57 Pac. 936 (1899).
8. Nimick v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 18 Fed. Cas. 247 (No. 10266) (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1871)
Van Zandt v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 169 (1873) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-
33-01 (1960).
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this definition. 9 Nevertheless, the majority of the courts apply the
clause to the self-destruction of an insane insured who is incapable
of realizing the consequences of his act or of forming an intention
to kill himself;'o they reason that this is the logical result intended
by the insurance companies."' One court has even held that the
statutory definition of suicide as "the intentional taking of one's
own life" is not controlling.
2
While the majority courts argue that their rule represents the
intent of the contracting parties, the "sane or insane" clause excludes
no more than "insane suicide," which properly includes only inten-
tional self-destruction where the decedent understands the conse-
quences of his act, but is unable to resist an insane desire. 13 By
including all insane self-destruction, the majority view reaches the
anomalous result that the insurer is liable where the insured, if
sane, unintentionally destroys himself, but the insurer escapes
liability where the insured, if insane, unintentionally destroys him-
self. 14  This confusion is unnecessary since the insurance companies
could specifically exclude all deaths resulting from insanity, 15 and
the courts would not have to re-write the policy.
All jurisdictions agree that an irresistible impulse to kill oneself
is within the clause's application, 16 a correct result under the
definition of "insane suicide." A few include accidental death,
7
but most jurisdictions maintain that this, even though caused by
the hand of the insured, is not within the clause. 8 Unless prohibited
by statute, as in Missouri,'9 the "suicide, sane or insane" clause
is considered valid.
2 0
The opinion in the instant case adopts the reasoning of the majority
view that any other conclusion would involve too much difficulty
in trying to determine various degrees of insanity. 2' The leading
9. Van Zandt v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. supra note 8; Life Ins. Co. v. Terry,
supra note 6.
10. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Blum, 258 Fed. 897 (9th Cir. 1919) ; De Gogorza
v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 65 N.Y. 232 (1875) ; Billings v. Accident Ins. Co. of North
America, 64 Vt. 78, 24 Atl. 656 (1892).
11. Clarke v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 118 Fed. 374 (4th Cir. 1902) ; Seitzinger v.
Modern Woodmen of America, 204 Ill. 58, 68 N.E. 478 (1903) ; De Gogorza v. Knicker-
bocker Life Ins. Co., supra note 10.
12. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Blum, supra note 10.
13. Christensen v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 97 Ga. 807, 30 S.E.2d 471 (1944)
National Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 194 Ky. 355, 239 S.W. 35 (1922).
14. See Commissioner Ear's dissent in De Gogorza at 249 which was adopted in
Christensen v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 13.
15. E.g., Kaskowitz v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1958) ; Fields v.
Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 352 Mo. 141, 176 S.W.2d 281 (1943). But cf. Weber v. Interstate
Business Men's Acc. Ass'n., 48 N.D. 307, 184 N.W. 97 (1921) where the court followed
the minority view and struck down a similiar provision in the insurance contract.
16. Clarke v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., supra note 11; National Life Ins. Co. v. Wat-
son, supra note 13.
17. Hartin v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 124 S.C. 397, 117 S.E. 409 (1923) ; Campbell v.
Order of Washington, 53 Wash. 398, 102 Pac. 410 (1909).
18. Northwestern Nut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212, 4 N.E. 582 (1886); De
Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., supra note 10.
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.620 (1959) ; Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489
(1907).
20. Aufrichtig v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 298 Mo. 1, 249 S.W. 912 (1923) De
Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 65 N.Y. 232 (1875).
21. Clarke v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 118 Fed. 374 (4th Cir. 1902) ; Spruill v.
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cases establishing this rule are rather old, and while the reasoning
may have been justified in their time, the developments of modern
medicine and psychology weaken the support of that argument since
insanity is now generally regarded as a disease. 2 The logical
conclusion is that a death resulting from the insured's insanity
should place the same liability on the insured as would a death
resulting from cancer or any other disease not specifically excluded
by the insurance contract.
Dictum in an early North Dakota case 23 indicated a preference
for the majority view. The court in a later decision, however,
apparently adopted the minority view in holding the insurer liable
for the self-destruction of the insane insured even though the policy
specifically excluded all deaths resulting from mental disease.
24
CARLTON J. HUNKE
EMINENT DOMAIN-EFFECTS OF (AIRPLANE) NOISE AND VIBRA-
TION-NECESSITY OF OVERFLIGHTS FOR FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING
-The plaintiff owned residential property within 2,000 feet of a
portion of Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, on which jet engines
were continually tested. She alleged her property was "taken"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution because it was rendered uninhabitable by the incessant
jet noise and vibration. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of South Carolina held, that there could be no taking
without flights over the plaintiff's land. United States v. Leavell,
234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
That the technical trespass of direct overflight is necessary
before there can be a "taking" under these circumstances has been
read into the two Supreme Court decisions in this area. The first,
United States v. Causby,1 held that although the land might have
been used for other purposes, there was a "taking" when the glide
path of the aircraft crossed the plaintiff's land at an altitude below
that classified by statute as "navigable airspace, ' 2 rendering the
plaintiff's chicken farm unproductive. Subsequently, Congress added
the airspace necessary for takeoffs and landings to the "navigable
airspace. '" But in the second of these two decisions, Griggs v.
Allegheny County,' the Court found that although the new limits
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 N.C. 141, 27 S.E. 39 (1897).
22. 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 92 (1949).
23. Clemens v. Royal Neighbors of America, 14 N.D. 116, 103 N.W. 402, 404 (1905).
24. Weber v. Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n., 48 N.D. 307, 184 N.W. 97 (1921).
1. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
2. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 3, 52 Stat. 973. See also, Air Commerce
Act. of 1926, ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. 568 (establishing free right of air transit for interstate
and foreign commerce).
3. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24).
4. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
